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DA VEY AND THE LIMITS OF EQUALITY
Laura S. Underkuffler*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In Locke v. Davey,' the United States Supreme Court (by a 7-2 vote) upheld
a Washington State college scholarship program that denied funds to students who
pursued degrees that were "devotional in nature or designed to induce religious
faith."2 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, rejected the argument
that because the program's restriction lacked facial neutrality, it violated federal
constitutional guarantees.
Although Davey might appear-at first blush-to have addressed a fairly
narrow question, the Court's decision in this case assumes great significance
because of other recent action by the Court. In particular, the Court had
previously held in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris' that the federal Establishment
Clause presented no bar to voucher funding of religious schools. This decision
was anticipated to clear the way for aggressive adoption of school voucher
programs by state and local governments. However, voucher proponents have
found themselves stymied by more stringent state constitutional provisions that
prohibit taxpayer funding (including voucher funding) of religious education.4
Whether states could persist in these denials became the most important question
in the post-Zelman landscape. Voucher proponents broadly argued that state nofunding laws that lack facial neutrality-that is, those that single out religion for
exercise,
federal free
treatment-violate
disadvantageous
particular,
antiestablishment, and equal protection guarantees. Since Davey involved a state
law of this type, it promised to shed light on the general ability of state
governments to deny equal funding for religious activities or institutions on the
basis of the states' own (more stringent) antiestablishment guarantees.

* Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law.
1. 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
2. Id. at 716 (quoting Petr. Br. at 6).
3. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
4. See e.g. Cal. Teachers Assn. v. Riles, 632 P.2d 953 (Cal. 1981); Bush v. Holmes, 886 So. 2d 340
(Fla. 1st Dist. App. 2004); Spears v. Honda, 449 P.2d 130 (Haw. 1968); Epeldi v. Engelking, 488 P.2d
860 (Idaho 1971); Fannin v. Williams, 655 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1983); Op. of the JJ. to the Sen., 514 N.E.2d
353 (Mass. 1987); Paster v. Tussey, 512 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. 1974); Dickman v. Sch. Dist. No. 62C, 366 P.2d
533 (Or. 1961); Elbe v. Yankton Indep. Sch. Dist., 372 N.W.2d 113 (S.D. 1985); Almond v. Day, 89
S.E.2d 851 (Va. 1955); Chittenden Town Sch. Dist. v. Dept. of Educ., 738 A.2d 539 (Vt. 1999); Weiss v.
Bruno, 509 P.2d 973 (Wash. 1973).

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2004

1

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 40 [2004], Iss. 2, Art. 4
TULSA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:267

In Davey, the Court rejected the notion that states are required by the
federal Constitution to provide equal funding for religious institutions or
activities. The core federal constitutional concern, the Court held, is that a state
act to protect legitimate interests and not to express hostility toward religious
persons or religious affairs. In this case, Washington articulated credible
antiestablishment concerns as the reason for its action. Simple declination to fund
religion is not, in itself, evidence that a state law is intended to suppress religion or
is inherently hostile to it. In the absence of evidence of a link between a particular
state law and animus toward religion, the denial of funding for religion alone
violates no federal constitutional guarantee.
Although clothed in somewhat humble factual garb, Davey is one of the
most important decisions that the Court has rendered in the religion field in the
past two decades. In particular, the outer limit of the "equality model"-the idea
that religion and nonreligion must be treated equally-finally has been marked in
this case. This model, which gained momentum with the Court's recent public
fora,6 instructional materials,7 and vouchers decisions, 8 threatened to engulf the
Court's jurisprudence in this field. Davey makes it clear that, in the short term at
least, this will not happen. I shall suggest that this is welcome news for those who
fear religion's divisive power and wish to preserve its vibrancy in American life.
II.

THE LOCKE V. DAVEY CASE

In 1979, the Washington Legislature created the Promise Scholarship
Program, which provides a scholarship, renewable for one year, for the postsecondary educational expenses of eligible students. To be eligible for the
scholarship, a student must meet certain academic, income and enrollment
requirements. With respect to the last requirement, the student must enroll at
least half-time in an eligible post-secondary institution. Eligible institutions
include those that are affiliated with religious institutions. However, while
receiving the scholarship, the student may not pursue a "degree in theology," a
requirement that codifies Washington's constitutional prohibition on the
expenditure of State funds for the pursuit of degrees that are "devotional in nature
or designed to induce religious faith." 9
Joshua Davey was awarded a Promise Scholarship and chose to attend a
private, religiously affiliated college. He subsequently decided to pursue a degree
in pastoral ministries. Upon communicating this decision to college officials, he
5. See Davey, 540 U.S. at 719-25.
6. See e.g. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the U. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (upholding equal

access for religious groups to university-sponsored plans which would pay for a student newspaper's
costs); Capitol Square Rev. & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995) (plurality opinion) (requiring

equal access for religious groups to a state-owned square); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free
Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993) (requiring equal access by religious groups to school facilities for afterschool activities).
7. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (upholding state law that required equal provision of
secular instructional materials to religious and nonreligious schools).
8. See Zelman, 536 U.S. 639.
9. See Davey, 540 U.S. at 716 (quoting Wash. Rev. Code § 28B.10.814 (1997); Petr. Br. at 6).
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was told that the scholarship funds could not be used for the pursuit of that
degree. He then brought suit against the State of Washington, contending that its
rule violated the Free Exercise, Establishment, and Free Speech Clauses of the
First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
of the Constitution. 10
Chief Justice Rehnquist's brief majority opinion presented the case as one of
no great difficulty.
It began by observing that the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment are frequently in tension, and that
there must be "'room for play in the joints' between them."11 In other words, it is
by the Establishment Clause but
possible for some state actions to be "permitted
12
not requiredby the Free Exercise Clause.,
This was, in the Court's view, such a case. Because "the link between
government funds and religious training [in this case would be] broken by the
independent and private choice of recipients,"13 the federal Establishment Clause
would present no barrier to state funding for Mr. Davey's education, should the
State of Washington wish to do so. "[T]here is no doubt that the State could,
consistent with the federal Constitution, permit Promise Scholars to pursue a
degree in devotional theology ..... , However, the question before the Court was
not whether the State of Washington could fund Davey's study of theology, but
whether it was required by the federal Constitution to do so.
In an effort to establish this, Davey made several arguments. First, he
argued that the denial of state funding for those who pursue religious majors
lacked facial neutrality with respect to religion and thus was presumptively
unconstitutional under the "equal treatment" guarantees of the Free Exercise
Clause. 5 The Court disagreed. The fact that "a [sitate would deal differently with
religious education for the ministry than with education for other callings"' 6 does
not, in itself, violate any free exercise guarantee. Different treatment in this
regard simply permits a state to vindicate its "antiestablishment interests," a
concern of long and deeply entrenched historical pedigree. 7
Indeed, the
particular question here-the use of taxpayer funds to train and support religious
leaders-was the subject of vehement objection by dissenting citizens at the time
of the Nation's founding. "That early state constitutions saw no problem in
explicitly excluding only the ministry from receiving state
dollars reinforces our
18
conclusion that religious instruction is of a different ilk.,

10.
11.
12.
13.

See Davey, 540 U.S. at 717.
Id. at 718 (quoting Walz v. Tax Commn., 397 U.S. 664,669 (1970)).
Id. at 719 (emphasis added).
Id. I have called this the "theory of the individual as causative agent."

See Laura S.

Underkuffler, Vouchers and Beyond: The Individual As Causative Agent in Establishment Clause

Jurisprudence,75 Ind. L.J. 167 (2000) (critiquing the idea that state money can be laundered through
"private choice" as a way to avoid Establishment Clause guarantees).
14. Davey, 540 U.S. at 719.
15. See id.

16. Id. at 721.
17. See id. at 722-23.
18. Id. at 723 (emphasis in original and footnote omitted).
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The Court cautioned that if a state law is intended (in fact) to suppress
religious exercise, it will be invalid on that ground. 9 However, the Court held that
there was no evidence of that in this case. The Washington rule applies neither
criminal nor civil sanctions to any type of religious service or rite. It does not deny
ministers the right to participate in political affairs. It permits student recipients
to attend pervasively religious schools, and does not require students to choose
between their religious beliefs and the receipt of any government benefit. "The
State has merely chosen not to fund a distinct category of instruction., 20 Its
decision to do so is a product of its legitimate antiestablishment interests, not
hostility toward religious persons or religious affairs. 21
The claim by Davey and amicus parties that Washington's constitutional
provision was "aso-called 'Blaine Amendment,' which has been linked with antiCatholicism,"22 was rejected by the Court as well. "As the State notes and Davey
,,23
does not dispute, . . . the provision in question is not a Blaine Amendment.
In
the absence of any "credible connection" between the Blaine Amendment and the
Washington constitutional
provision, "the Blaine Amendment's history is simply
24
not before us."
Davey's other arguments were similarly, and summarily, rejected. For
instance, relying on Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia,25
Davey argued that the Promise Scholarship Program was an unconstitutional
26
viewpoint restriction on speech. In Rosenberger and other cases, the Court had
previously held that when a forum for public speech is created or maintained by
government, equal access to that forum must be given, if requested, to the
religious viewpoint. The Court responded that the Promise Scholarship Program
"is not a forum for speech" and thus, "[o]ur cases dealing with speech forums are
simply inapplicable. ' 27 Davey's claim under the Equal Protection Clause was
similarly dismissed. "Because... the program [does not violate] the Free Exercise
Clause," the Court wrote, "we apply rational-basis scrutiny"'21 to 29this claim. And
"[f]or the reasons stated herein, the program passes such review.,

19. See Davey, 540 U.S. at 724-25; Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 546-47 (1993).
20. Davey, 540 U.S. at 721.
21. See id. at 720-25.
22. Id. at 723 n. 7. In 1875, Congressman James G. Blaine of Maine introduced a federal
constitutional amendment that would have prohibited the payment of tax money, raised for
educational purposes, to institutions under religious control. See Lloyd P. Jorgenson, The State and the
Non-Public School, 1825-1925, at 138-40 (U. Mo. Press 1987). Although this federal amendment failed,
contemporary state constitutional provisions that prohibit public funding for religious schools are often
labeled "Blaine Amendments" or "Little Blaines" by those who oppose them.
23. Davey, 540 U.S. at 723 n. 7.
24. Id.
25. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
26. See e.g. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. 819; Capitol Square Rev., 515 U.S. 753; Lamb's Chapel,508 U.S.
384.
27. Davey, 540 U.S. at 720 n. 3.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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Thus, the primary question that remained after Zelman-whether states are
required, as well as permitted, to fund religious education-has been clearly and
decisively answered in the negative. As long as state refusals to fund religious
education are grounded in legitimate, antiestablishment interests, they will pass
federal constitutional muster. Different treatment of religious education that is
grounded in a state's desire to avoid the enmeshment of church and state is
permissible under federal constitutional guarantees.
11.

ANALYZING DAVEY: AN UPHILL CLIMB FOR FEDERAL CHALLENGE

The Davey decision does not preclude federal constitutional challenges to
state no-funding laws-it only makes them more difficult In this section, I will
discuss just how difficult those challellenges, post-Davey, will be.
As a broad historical matter, state antiestablishment efforts were products of
the same conditions that motivated federal-level reforms. At the time of the
American Revolution, religious establishments existed in one form or another in
all of the American colonies. Common forms included "taxpayer assistance to
religious institutions, state enforcement of favored religious observance and
conformity, religious tests for public office or general civil capacity, and other
preferential treatment on the basis of religious affiliation or belief., 30 All forms of
such establishments were generally considered to be pernicious by reformers, even
though they were believed by others to be essential for the survival of both
religion and state.3
During the early post-Revolutionary period, the success of reformers at the
federal level was not mirrored in the states. Indeed, at the time of their adoption,
the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment were viewed by the vast majority of
people not as guarantors of fundamental individual liberties, but as guarantors
that state religious establishments would not be threatened by a rival
establishment created by the federal government. The acceptance at the state
level of the existence of church-state integration was reflected in state
constitutions adopted in the late eighteenth century. Almost all contained explicit
references to preferred religious beliefs, religious tests for public office, state
support of particular religious organizations, and other forms of religious
establishment.32
30. Laura Underkuffler-Freund, The Separation of the Religious and the Secular: A Foundational
Challenge to First Amendment Theory, 36 Wm.& Mary L. Rev. 837, 930 (1995). See also id. at 879-91,
930-60 (discussing this history).
31. See id. at 930-40.
32. See e.g. Del. Const. art. 22 (1776) (repealed 1792 by Del. Const art. I, § 2) (oath for state officers
required a profession of faith "in God the Father, and in Jesus Christ His only Son, and in the Holy
Ghost, one God, blessed for evermore"); Md. Const. art XXXIII (1776) (amended 1851) (equal
protection in religious liberty limited to "persons professing the Christian religion"); Mass. Const. pt. I,
art. 11 (1780) (amended 1833 by Mass. Const. amend. XI) (taxes would be collected for the support of
"public Protestant teachers of piety, religion, and morality"); N.J. Const. art. XVIII-XIX (1776)
(repealed 1844 by N.J. Const. art I, § 4) (limiting public office to those persons "professing a belief in
the faith of any Protestant sect"); N.C. Const. art. XXXII (1776) (repealed 1868 by N.C. Const. art. I, §
26) (denying public office to any person "who shall deny the being of God or the truth of the
Protestant religion, or the divine authority either of the Old or New Testaments"); S.C. Const. art.
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Struggles within the states against such establishments were long and
complex. Although overt sectarian references and compelled taxpayer support of
religious institutions largely disappeared from state constitutions over the next
five decades,33 struggles for sectarian influence over public institutions continued
throughout the nineteenth-century and into the twentieth century in most states.
The content of public school curricula and the question of public funding of
private religious schools were lightning-rod issues for larger social, political, and
religious debates. Eventual legal bars to the use of taxpayer funds for religious
schools were a response to complex forces, including pressures for funding and
curricula control by Protestant, Catholic, and other religious groups. While there
is evidence that nativism and religious prejudice (particularly anti-Catholicism)
motivated popular clamor for some of these laws, they were also supported by
those who represented
minority religious groups or who simply believed in the
34
separationist ideal.

It is, therefore, very difficult to identify the historical "origins" of state nofunding laws. In addition, most have now been in place, in one form or another,
for more than one hundred years. During that period, whatever political forces
originally supported those laws, others have arisen to replace them. Even if-as
opponents claim-the original enactments of some of those laws were tainted with

religious prejudice, the re-enactment or endorsement of those laws in more recent
decades undoubtedly has been the product of far more diverse antiestablishment,
political, religious, and educational concerns. 35

In view of this history, a federal constitutional challenge to state no-funding
laws would appear to be an uphill battle. After Davey, opponents cannot rely on
the simple lack of facial neutrality between religion and nonreligion in such laws

to establish their unconstitutionality.

Rather, they must demonstrate that a

XXXVIII (1778) (repealed 1790 by S.C. Const. art. VIII, § 1) ("The Christian Protestant religion shall
be deemed, and is hereby constituted and declared to be, the established religion of this State."). See
generally Underkuffler-Freund, supra n. 30, at 874-960 (discussing colonial and state establishments in
the late eighteenth century).
33. Massachusetts was the last state to abolish taxation for the support of religious institutions,
accomplishing this by constitutional amendment in 1833. See supra n. 32.
34. See e.g. Jorgenson, supra n. 22, at 138-40 (discussing the complicated political, religious, and
educational concerns that motivated nineteenth-century anti-funding laws).
For instance, the
motivation for state funding bans enacted in Michigan, Wisconsin, Indiana, and Minnesota seemed to
have little to do with the anti-Catholicism expressed elsewhere. See Steven K. Green, "Blaming
Blaine": Understandingthe BlaineAmendment and the "No-Funding"Principle,2 First Amend. L. Rev.
107,126-27 (2003).
35. For instance, when-in 1968-the Florida Constitutional Revision Commission proposed the
removal of the Florida Constitution's prohibition on the payment of public monies to religious or
sectarian institutions, the Florida Legislature took action to retain and to strengthen the restriction.
See Bush, 886 So. 2d at 351. In California, an attempt to amend the state constitution to allow the use
of publicly funded vouchers in sectarian schools was defeated overwhelmingly by voters in 1993. See
Cynthia Bright, The Establishment Clauseand School Vouchers: Private Choice and Proposition174, 31
Cal. W. L. Rev. 193, 194-97 (1995). An attempt to amend the New York Constitution to permit
religious-school funding was defeated (after a divisive battle) in 1967. See Lewis B. Kaden, The People:
No! Some Observationson the 1967 New York ConstitutionalConvention, 5 Harv. J. on Legis. 343, 359
(1968). And the prohibition on non-public school funding contained in the Constitution of Michigan
was adopted in 1970 after extensive public debate. See Sch. Dist. of Traverse City v. Atty. Gen., 185
N.W.2d 9, 13 (Mich. 1971).
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particularstate law (in its current incarnation) has no legitimate grounding, and is,
instead, motivated by anti-religious or anti-sectarian sentiment. This is a very
difficult task when we must focus on the contemporary reasons for the existence
of such laws, and when contemporary anti-religious or anti-sectarian sentiment (if
there is any) is deeply intertwined with legitimate antiestablishment concerns.
Is this outcome the correct one? To my mind, it is the only reasonable
choice. If hostility to religion is to be our touchstone for constitutional validity in
this area, it is only sensible that something more than conflicting evidence of
popular sentiments expressed a hundred or a hundred and fifty years ago be
required to prove that hostility. Old evidence might be very useful in forcing us,
as a nation, to face our long history of religious hostilities and bigotries; it is far
less useful in understanding the complex forces that undergird current popular
support for no-funding laws. Indeed, even those who argue that such laws were
often steeped in anti-Catholic prejudice in the nineteenth century admit that the
reasons for their perpetuation are far more complex.36 When we consider the
contemporary legal validity of contemporary state funding bans, it only makes
sense that we should consider what those bans mean today.
IV.

DAVEY'S DEEPER IMPLICATIONS

Davey's role in upholding the federal constitutional validity of state nofunding laws is important in itself. The importance of the decision, however, does
not end there. In the beginning of this article, I stated that Davey is one of the
most important church-state opinions that the Court has rendered in the past two
decades. In this section, I will explain why this is so.
For many years, the animating principles of the Court's Religion Clause
jurisprudence could be readily identified. "Free religious exercise" meant explicit,
constitutional recognition of the value of religion in individual lives,37 and the
protection of religious exercise absent the presence of a compelling government
interest. 38 "Freedom from establishment of religion by government" meant,
primarily, the institutional separation of church and state.39 The Court's
interpretations of both guarantees were united by a common assumption: that
religion is different-specially valuable, and thus specially protected; specially
dangerous, and thus specially prohibited.
It is true that there were potentially contrary strains in the Court's opinions.
For instance, the principle of "neutrality," articulated by the Court as part of its
Establishment Clause guarantee, was stated to require evenhandedness toward
religion and nonreligion; in theory, neither could be favored over the other by
36. See e.g. Joseph P. Viteritti, Blaine's Wake: School Choice, the First Amendment, and State
ConstitutionalLaw, 21 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Policy 657, 659 n. 10 (1998).
37. See e.g. U.S. v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-87 (1944); W. Va. St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 642 (1943).
38. See e.g. Hernandez v. Commr., 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989); Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of the Ind. Empl.
Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 717-19 (1981); Wis. v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972).
39. See e.g. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962) ("[Ulnion of government and religion tends to
destroy government and to degrade religion.").
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government. 40 The clash of this principle with the idea of special protection of
religion (under the Free Exercise Clause) was obvious. However, despite such
potentially disharmonious strains, the general philosophical posture of the Court
was clear. Religion, in both positive and negative ways, was a special force in
human life.
In 1988, the Court abruptly changed course. In Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Association1a and Employment Division v. Smith,a2 decided
two years later, a new approach to the Free Exercise Clause emerged. Under this
new approach, if the prohibiting or burdening of religion is the object of a
challenged law, the law must be justified by a compelling state interest. However,
if religion is not so targeted-if the law is "neutral" in its objective-then there is
no cognizable claim under the Free Exercise Clause. 3
With this single (or dual) stroke, the Court radically shifted the foundation
of its Religion Clause jurisprudence. As a result of these decisions, an approach
which had required special judicial solicitation for religion was replaced by what is
essentially an antidiscrimination guarantee.
Under the new approach,
government could not intentionally target religion for particular disabilities.
However, it could sweep religious interests-along with other interests-within
the general prohibitions of "religiously neutral" laws. As a result, half of the
constitutionally mandated "special" character of religion-that is, its special value,
and its special protection-was gone.
For several years, the demise of religion's special place in free exercise cases
rested uneasily with the apparent retention of the special treatment of religion
under the Establishment Clause. 4 Since the same conception of religion as a
particularly powerful force underlies special treatment in both contexts, the
demise of religion's special treatment in one context, but its retention in the other,

40. See e.g. Epperson v. Ark., 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) ("The First Amendment mandates
governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion and nonreligion.");
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) ("The 'establishment of religion' clause of the
First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.").
41. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
42. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
43. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 878; Lyng, 485 U.S. at 449, 451-52. The idea that evenhanded or
"neutral" government regulations might be immune from free exercise challenge was advanced in
Goldman v. Weinberger, decided in 1986. However, since that case dealt with military regulations,
which (presumably) enjoy particularly protected status, the significance of this move was not
appreciated until the decision in Lyng, two years later. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 510
(1986).
44. During this period, the implications of a broad idea of "equality" for religious and nonreligious
interests in Religion Clause jurisprudence dominated scholarly reviews. See e.g. Alan E. Brownstein,
Harmonizingthe Heavenly and Earthly Spheres: The Fragmentationand Synthesis of Religion, Equality,
and Speech in the Constitution, 51 Ohio St. L.J. 89 (1990); Douglas Laycock, Formal,Substantive, and
DisaggregatedNeutrality Toward Religion, 39 DePaul L. Rev. 993 (1990); William P. Marshall, What is
the Matter with Equality?: An Assessment of the Equal Treatment of Religion and Nonreligion in First
Amendment Jurisprudence,75 Ind. L.J. 193 (2000); Stephen Pepper, Conflicting Paradigmsof Religious
Freedom: Liberty Versus Equality, 1993 BYU L. Rev. 7.
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seemed difficult to rationalize. 45 The inconsistency in the Court's approach was
noted by scholars, and some boldly suggested that religion should be stripped of
46
its special status across the board.

The Court, however, made few apparent moves to address the paradox. In
several cases involving public fora, the Court stressed the need for government
"neutrality" toward religion, which required equal treatment of religious and
nonreligious groups.47 This could be interpreted as endorsement of the idea that

religion must suffer no special disabilities under the Establishment Clause.
However, the rationales of other decisions undercut this conclusion. For instance,
in Agostini v. Felton,48 the Court upheld a program that sent public school teachers

into religious schools to provide remedial services, citing (as pivotal) the absence
41
of traditional, "separationist," Establishment Clause concerns.
In 2000, a clear break with the past was signaled. In Mitchell v. Helms,5 ° the
plurality opinion seemed to endorse the idea that equal treatment of religion and
nonreligion is the hallmark of Establishment Clause concerns. Mitchell involved a
challenge to a federal program under which computers and other technical
materials and services were purchased with federal money by local school districts,
and distributed as "loans" to all schools within the district's geographical
boundaries, including private religious schools. Using a blended theory of
"neutrality" and "private choice," the plurality found that this program posed no
Establishment Clause problem. 5' Aid was distributed on the basis of enrollment,
and enrollment was determined by parental (not government) choice. The
program used "neutral, secular" criteria for aid decisions that neither favored nor

45. For instance, as I previously wrote:
The fundamental reason for the different treatment of religious and secular institutions, as
reflected in traditional understandings of the Establishment Clause, is the belief that religion
is different, and that religious institutions reflect that difference. We worry about the merger
of religion and government-we worry about the endorsement of religion by governmentwe worry about the funding of religion by government-because of the particularvalue and
resultant power that religion has in individual lives. The movement to a neutrality or
"parity" paradigm in Establishment Clause jurisprudence is possible only if we shed this
idea. . . . To do this, we must first conclude that religion as a specially powerful-and
specially valuable-force in human lives is one to which we no longer subscribe.
Laura S. Underkuffler, The Price of Vouchers for Religious Freedom, 78 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 463,
476 (2001). Arguably, it is just this view of religion that Lyng and Smith reflect.
46. See e.g. Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The
ConstitutionalBasisfor ProtectingReligious Conduct, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1245 (1994).
47. See e.g. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 845-46; Capitol Square Rev., 515 U.S. at 770; Lamb's Chapel,
508 U.S. at 394.
48. 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
49. For instance, the Court cited the facts that there was no evidence that the program's services
"supplanted" those offered in religious schools, id. at 229; that the program created a "financial
incentive to undertake religious indoctrination," id. at 231; that the services provided were of a
religious character, id. at 223-28; or that the secular character of those services could not be ensured
without excessive entanglement of church and state, id. at 232-35.
50. 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
51. See id. at 809-32.
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disfavored religious schools. Finally, the aid that was provided was itself
"secular,
2

neutral, and nonideological" in nature, and was used in public schools.
Although the plurality in Mitchell expressed some concern about traditional
Establishment Clause dangers,53 with the implicit "special treatment" of religion

that these involve, the ideas of neutrality and private choice seemed to be far
more powerful in determining the outcome. If government aid to religion is
"neutral"-if it is "offered to a broad range of groups or persons without regard
to . . . religion"-then it is unreasonable, the plurality wrote, to conclude that
religious indoctrination had occurred at government behest. 54 And if individuals

are involved in channeling government money to religious uses, "a government
cannot, or at least cannot easily, grant special favors" 55 to religion, the apparent
test (in the plurality's view) for Establishment Clause concerns.
The power of the "equality model" in Establishment Clause jurisprudence
was seemingly confirmed in Zelman, decided two years later. In Zelman, the

question was whether the funding of religious schools with taxpayer money
through voucher programs presented an Establishment Clause violation. In
answering this question, the Court assumed that the pivotal Establishment Clause
issue was the favoring (or disfavoring) of religion by government. The Court held
that since the law was facially neutral, with any disproportionate benefit to
religious schools (through greater student enrollment) being the product of

private choice, there was no violation of the Establishment Clause. 56
The Mitchell and Zelman cases were criticized for their holding that public
money can be shed of its public character if laundered through private choice.57

The idea that through this rationale, religious institutions might be in line for
possibly massive amounts of public funding disturbed those who believed that the

Establishment Clause contains far more robust guarantees. 5 8 Underlying concern,
however, went far beyond this narrow question. Exactly how far did this "equality
model" go? We had already seen the Court's rejection of the traditional idea of
religion's special positive qualities, in the interpretation of the Free Exercise
Clause. Were the special dangers of religion (mixed with government) now
rejected, as well? Would the "equality model" mean the end of any disabilities for
52. See id. at 832.
53. For instance, the plurality was particularly insistent that religious "indoctrination" not be done
at government behest. See id. at 809-14.
54. Id. at 809-10.
55. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 810.
56. See Zelman 536 U.S. at 652-55 (stating that challenged law is "facially neutral"; "[p]rogram
benefits are available. . . on neutral terms"; "no reasonable observer would think a neutral program of
private choice... carries with it the imprimatur of government endorsement [of religion]" (emphasis in
original)).
57. See e.g. Green, supra n. 34, at 107-08; Laura S. Underkuffler, The "Blaine" Debate: Must States
Fund Religious Schools?, 2 First Amend. L. Rev. 179 (2003). For a general critique of this theory, see
Underkuffler, supran. 13.
58. For instance, markedly absent from this approach is the traditional requirement that state aid
provide only "incidental" benefit to religious schools. See e.g. Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works of Md.,
426 U.S. 736, 747 (1976) ("The State may not ... pay for what is actually a religious education, even
though it purports to be paying for a secular one, and even though it makes its aid available to secular
and religious institutions alike.").
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religious practices or institutions, as a part of government, under the
Establishment Clause? Would the "equality model," through some marriage of
free exercise and (redefined) antiestablishment guarantees, require the
affirmatively equal treatment of religion and nonreligion by state and federal
governments?
In Davey, we seem to have our answer. For the current Court, at least, the
"equality model" will not go so far. Although Davey dealt with the ability of
states to recognize religion's special dangers, the Court's acknowledgment of the
validity of those concerns in that context strongly indicates that they will be
recognized in other contexts as well. The dangers of the mixture of religion and
government may be denied in voucher cases and others involving "private choice,"
but they will not be denied as a general matter in church-state jurisprudence.
Religion is different, and that difference will be reflected in the Court's evaluation
of government's practices and policies.
In my view, the importance of this holding is immense. The religious
tolerance that exists in this country is both situational and thin. No one could
witness the hostility to Islam that emerged after the events of September 11, 2001,
and deny that religion remains a bitter and divisive force. To the extent that we
have achieved religious freedom and tolerance in this country, it is precisely
because we have enforced institutional separation of religion and state. More
particularly, we have not forced individuals to conform to government-chosen
religious exercise, and we have not forced taxpayers to fund religious groups and
activities with which they deeply disagree. Davey's reassertion of the special
dangers presented by the merger of religion and government is a welcome sign
that we have perhaps not forgotten all that we have learned.
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